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Abstract: This study empirically examines the determinants of the utilization of regional trade 
agreements (RTAs). To this end, RTA utilization data with rich country variations in both importing and 
exporting countries are used. Specifically, the data include trade data among 16 exporters and six 
importers in Asia. An “RTA utilization rate,” which is defined as the share of imports under RTA regimes 
out of total imports of RTA-eligible products, is computed. The RTA utilization rate is regressed at a 
country pair-product level on various elements. As a result, the RTA utilization rate is found to be higher 
when the preference margin is larger, the importer’s demand is larger, the exporter’s income is lower, 
and the importer’s border handling is more efficient. Furthermore, RTA utilization rates are lower when 
a generalized scheme for preferences for least developed countries is available, when exporting finished 
products, and when the inward foreign direct investment in the importing country is larger. 
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1. Introduction 
Enhancing firms’ utilization of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has become 
important. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), as of January 17, 2020, 303 
RTAs were in force.1 Even after RTAs came into effect, some firms continued to utilize 
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1 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 
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general tariff rates, such as most favored nation (MFN) rates. Generally, the major reason is 
that firms must conduct two additional processes to use an RTA regime: comply with rules 
of origin (RoOs) and obtain certificates of origin (CoOs). Firms will utilize an RTA regime 
only if the gains from lower RTA tariffs exceed the costs incurred.2 Enjoying the benefits 
from RTAs requires that the number of RTA partner countries be increased, and firms’ 
utilization of RTA regimes in trading must be enhanced.  
The academic literature has uncovered the role of various elements in the utilization 
of preferences. Traditional factors include preference margin (i.e., MFN tariffs minus 
preference tariffs), RoOs, and transaction sizes. Cadot et al. (2006), Francois, Hoekman, and 
Manchin (2006), Manchin (2006), Bureau, Chakir, and Gallezot (2007), Hayakawa, Kim, and 
Lee (2014), and Hakobyan (2015) documented the significant contribution of these 
elements.3 Some studies also examined the role of other elements. For example, Hayakawa, 
Kim, and Yoshimi (2017) investigated the effect of exchange rates and found that the 
appreciation of the export country’s currency reduces RTA utilization rates. Hayakawa 
(2014) examined the effect of cumulation rule in RoOs, and Hayakawa, Yoshimi, and Urata 
(2018) investigated the impact of other available RTA tariff rates. In summary, these studies 
uncovered the significant effects of various elements on preference utilization. 
In this study, the determinants of RTA utilization are examined by using RTA 
utilization data from multiple importing countries. Although many of the previously 
mentioned studies investigated the use of preference regimes, most of these studies 
employed data from a single importing country because of data access limitations. However, 
for single country data, the role of an importing country’s characteristics cannot be 
investigated because of no variation across importing countries. In addition, although the 
use of European Union (EU) import data allows for the inclusion of multiple importing 
countries (because the EU consists of multiple member countries), existing studies that used 
EU data investigated the utilization of unilateral trade regimes, such as a generalized 
scheme of preferences (GSP). Because these preference regimes are granted to developing 
countries, exporting countries included in the empirical analysis are restricted to developing 
countries. In contrast, this study’s exporting and importing countries include not only 
developing countries but also developed countries. The data used for this study have many 
variations across both exporting and importing countries. 
Specifically, the import data obtained from customs or statistical agencies in six 
countries/economies in Asia are employed, including Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea (henceforth, Korea), the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. This study focuses on 
these countries’ imports from the 10 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
                                                   
2 Cherkashin et al. (2015) and Hayakawa, Laksanapanyakul, and Urata (2016) estimate such costs for 
RTA utilization. 
3 Also, Conconi et al. (2018) found that, in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), RoOs 
on final goods reduced intermediate goods imports from non-member countries by approximately 30 
percentage points. 
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countries and the neighboring six countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New 
Zealand). Many bilateral or plurilateral RTAs are among these countries. Furthermore, the 
16 exporting countries are currently negotiating a mega-RTA—called the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which intends to create an RTA that covers 
the entire region. Enjoying the rich variation in exporting and importing countries uncovers 
the effects of various elements on RTA utilization, including exporter and importer 
characteristics. 
The findings of this study are summarized as follows. An “RTA utilization rate,” 
which is defined as the share of imports under RTA regimes out of total imports in RTA-
eligible products, is defined. “RTA-eligible products” are products for which RTAs set tariff 
rates lower than MFN tariff rates. Large differences in the RTA utilization rate across this 
study’s country-pairs were found. Then, the RTA utilization rate at the country pair-product 
level was regressed on various elements. As a result, the RTA utilization rate was found to 
be higher when the preference margin is larger, the importer’s demand is larger, the 
exporter’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is lower, and the importer’s efficiency 
score on border handling is higher. Furthermore, lower RTA utilization rates were found 
when the GSP for least developed countries (LDC) is available, when exporting finished 
products, and when inward foreign direct investments (FDI) are larger in the importing 
country.  
This study contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, these results are 
obtained from the empirical analysis for the data with rich country-variation in both 
importing and exporting countries. Thus, this study’s results have stronger external validity 
than existing studies that use single country data. Second, some of the findings of this study 
have never been revealed in the literature or are different from those in previous studies. 
For example, the role of FDI in preference utilization has never been examined in the 
literature. Furthermore, this study’s result of a higher utilization rate for finished products 
is opposite to that from Hakobyan (2015), who focused on exports from developing 
countries. Third, RTA utilization rates in Asian countries, including developing countries, 
are presented. Few studies exist on preference utilization in Asia, whereas most existing 
studies examined those in the United States, the EU, or other developed countries. For 
example, Keck and Lendle (2012) reported RTA utilization rates for imports by Australia, 
Canada, the EU, and the United States. Indeed, their magnitude is comparable to that in 
Japan but not necessarily with respect to other Asian countries. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section examines RTA 
utilization rates in this region. After providing this study’s empirical framework in section 
3, the estimation results are reported in section 4. Last, section 5 concludes this study. 
 
2. Utilization of RTAs in Asia 
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This study begins with the aggregated measures of RTA utilization rates, which are 
defined at a country pair level. Throughout the study, import data in 2016 for Indonesia, 
2018 for the Philippines, 2018 for Thailand, 2018 for Japan, 2018 for Korea, and 2016 for 
Taiwan were used. The focus is on their imports from the 16 Asian countries previously 
specified. These import data are obtained from the respective country’s customs or 
statistical agency; Indonesian Customs, the Philippine Statistics Authority, Thai Customs, 
Japanese Customs, Korean Customs, and Taiwanese Customs. Those entities cover all of the 
imports in each country. 
In this region, ASEAN has acted as the hub of an RTA network. Since 1993, ASEAN 
countries have gradually eliminated tariffs for intra-ASEAN trade. Subsequently, ASEAN 
expanded its RTA network with “plus-one countries,” including Australia, China, India, 
Japan, Korea, and New Zealand, by concluding so-called “ASEAN plus-one” RTAs. As a 
result, the following RTAs are covered in this study. The ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement 
and the five ASEAN plus-one RTAs are available in the trade among the ASEAN countries. 
Between Japan and ASEAN countries, the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (AJCEP) is available. Additionally, Japan has bilateral RTAs with all ASEAN 
countries, excluding Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, in addition to those with Australia, 
India, and New Zealand. Similarly, between Korea and ASEAN countries, the ASEAN–
Korea Free Trade Agreement is available. Korea also has bilateral RTAs with Singapore, 
Vietnam, and all plus-one countries, excluding Japan. Last, Taiwan has bilateral RTAs with 
China, Singapore, and New Zealand. 
Before examining RTA utilization rates, MFN tariff rates in the six importing countries 
are reviewed to determine the potential magnitude of the preference margins. In Table 1, 
the simple average of the MFN tariff rates is provided, which is calculated using the Tariff 
Analysis Online Facility provided by the WTO. The simple average rates are reported by 
the industry, which is defined by the tariff section of the harmonized system (HS). The three 
ASEAN countries have high MFN rates in transport equipment. Additionally, MFN tariff 
rates in agricultural and food industries (live animals, vegetable products, animal/vegetable 
fats and oils, and food products) are relatively high in Thailand. In contrast, in Japan, 
average MFN rates are relatively low: in most industries, they are less than three percent. 
Relatively high MFN rates can be found in food, leather, and footwear products. Korea 
highly protects its agricultural and food industries. Additionally, in Korea, many industries 
show average MFN rates higher than five percent. Taiwan keeps relatively high MFN rates 
for the agricultural and food industries and for transport equipment. 
 
Table 1 
 
The degree to which these RTAs are utilized in the imports of Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is examined. The share of imports under 
RTA regimes out of total imports in RTA-eligible products is computed. Several issues 
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should be noted. First, when multiple RTAs exist in a country pair, the imports under all 
available RTAs are simply aggregated. Furthermore, an RTA-eligible product is identified if 
at least one RTA offers lower tariff rates than MFN rates. Second, the data for Indonesian 
imports do not include any import records under the AJCEP. The utilization rate of 
Indonesian imports from Japan indicates only that of the bilateral RTA between Indonesia 
and Japan.4 Third, products with non-ad valorem MFN tariff rates are not included. This 
exclusion may underestimate the RTA utilization rate because such products tend to have a 
high preference margin in substance. Last, between China and Taiwan, only the early-
harvest program was entered into force under the Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA). Therefore, the number of eligible products is only approximately 300.5 
Table 2 reports the aggregated measures of the RTA utilization rate. Four noteworthy 
points are considered. First, when the GSP for LDC is available, RTA utilization rates are 
relatively low. This observation is found in particular in exports from Cambodia, Laos, and 
Myanmar to Japan. The relatively low utilization rate may simply occur because the GSP for 
LDC offers lower tariff rates than do RTAs. However, the utilization rate is rather high when 
exporting from Myanmar to Korea, although the GSP for LDC is available. Second, the 
utilization rates seem more depressed when exporting from higher-income countries, such 
as Japan, Korea, or Singapore. Third, the utilization rates tend to be higher when exporting 
to countries with larger markets, that is, Japan and Korea. Last, exceptionally high 
utilization rates (i.e., those greater than 90%) can be found when exporting from Australia 
and the Philippines to Japan, exporting from Myanmar to Korea, exporting from Brunei to 
the Philippines, and exporting from New Zealand to Taiwan. 
 
Table 2 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
In this section, the conceptual framework is first discussed to consider the 
determinants of RTA utilization. Then, the empirical framework is presented to examine 
those determinants.  
Demidova and Krishna (2008) presented the simple theoretical model of firms’ choice 
of tariff regimes. The basic settings in their model are as follows. The representative 
consumer in a country is assumed to have the preference specified as a constant elasticity of 
substitution function over the varieties. A continuum of monopolistically competitive 
heterogeneous firms in terms of productivity exists, similar to the setting in Melitz (2003). 
                                                   
4 The exclusion of imports from Japan under the AJCEP regime will not seriously underestimate the RTA 
utilization rate because bilateral RTAs rather than AJCEP are expected to be mainly used among Japan 
and ASEAN countries, if available. For example, when the Philippines imported goods from Japan in 
2018, the share of imports under the bilateral RTA out of total imports under RTAs was 97%. The same 
share level was also found when Thailand imported from Japan in 2018. 
5 For more details on the ECFA, see, for example, Chang and Hayakawa (2014). 
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Exporters can choose either RTA or general tariff rates (i.e., MFN rates) when exporting their 
varieties to an RTA partner country. Whereas RTA tariff rates are lower than MFN rates, 
firms need to comply with the RoOs of their variety. This compliance increases their 
procurement costs because the original sources should have been optimal. Furthermore, 
when using RTA rates, firms also bear a certain level of fixed costs to certify that their 
products meet the RoOs. 
Under these settings, the productivity cutoff is defined, which is the cutoff at which 
export profits under the MFN regime become equal to those under the RTA regime. Only 
firms with higher productivity than the cutoff invoke RoOs and use the RTA regime in 
exporting. Thus, firms with higher productivity are more likely to choose the RTA regime. 
Furthermore, the productivity cutoff depends on various characteristics, including wages in 
the exporting country, the importing country’s market size, fixed costs for RTA utilization, 
procurement adjustment costs, and preference margin. The cutoff becomes low when the 
exporting country has high wages, the importing country has a large market size, RTA 
utilization fixed costs and procurement adjustment costs are low, and the preference margin 
is high. For example, an increase in an importer’s market size or a reduction in an exporter’s 
wages enlarges firms’ operating profits in general, making even less productive firms cover 
the fixed costs for RTA use.  
The effects of these elements on the RTA utilization rate are also similar to those on 
the productivity cutoff. Indeed, an exporter’s wages, an importer’s market size, and fixed 
costs affect the utilization rate only through changes in the productivity cutoff, that is, those 
of the number of RTA users, because these elements change the magnitude of exports in 
both cases of RTA use and non-RTA use at the same proportion under the settings in 
Demidova and Krishna (2008). In contrast, the preference margin and the procurement 
adjustment costs affect not only the number of RTA exporters but also the relative 
magnitude of their exports to MFN users’ exports. Those impacts on a relative scale have 
the same direction as those on the number of RTA users. For example, the reduction in 
procurement adjustment costs increases not only the number of RTA exporters but also the 
magnitude of exports by each RTA exporter. As a result, although the impacts of an increase 
in procurement adjustment costs on RTA utilization rates are negative, those of an increase 
in the preference margin are positive.6 
Using this mechanism, the estimation equation is specified as follows. 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 𝑐𝑐𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 ln𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐮𝐮 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. (1) 
In this equation, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 refers to the RTA utilization rate when exporting product p 
from countries i to j. The independent variables include preference margin (Margin), the log 
of an importer’s GDP, and the log of an exporter’s GDP per capita. As a preference margin, 
                                                   
6 The distribution of firm productivity is another factor to determine the RTA utilization rate. Such a 
distribution in each country is controlled for by introducing export country-product fixed effects in the 
empirical analysis, that is, Table 5. 
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the MFN tariff rate minus the lowest available RTA tariff rate is used when multiple RTAs 
exist. The importer’s GDP is used as a proxy for its demand. Finding the proxy variable for 
wages is challenging because the data on observable wages also reflect workers’ quality or 
skills. Because the export countries in this study include LDC, for which a data limitation is 
likely, GDP per capita is selected. However, note that this measure represents not only 
wages but also various other elements, such as the degree of economic development. As a 
control variable, the log of the geographical distance between two countries (Distance) is also 
introduced, in addition to the logs of the importer’s and the exporter’s scores on trading 
across borders (Border score). These variables are expected to control for some of the trade 
costs other than tariffs. u includes a set of fixed effects. 
Variables related to RoOs are not explicitly introduced for at least three reasons. First, 
some previous studies introduced the RoOs restrictiveness index proposed in Estevadeordal 
(2000) or dummy variables on RoOs types (e.g., Carrere and De Melo, 2006). However, in 
this study on RTAs, no ready-made databases of RoOs “codes” exist that can be used to 
create the restrictiveness index or the dummy variables. Second, as mentioned in the 
previous section, many RTAs overlap between the two countries in the region of this study. 
Because RoOs may differ across RTAs, setting one specific type of RoOs is problematic for 
creating a single measure of the RoO restrictiveness index or the RoOs dummy variable. 
Third, although RoOs across RTAs may be generally different, this study’s focus on trade in 
Asia minimizes such a difference because RoOs are similar across RTAs among Asian 
countries. In particular, a typical type of RoOs in Asia is to require meeting either change-
in-heading or a regional value content of 40%. Then, the variation of RoOs across products 
was controlled for by introducing industry or product fixed effects. 
This study’s country-pairs and years are the same as those presented in the previous 
section. Data on imports from 16 Asian countries are used: 2016 for Indonesia, 2018 for the 
Philippines, 2018 for Thailand, 2018 for Japan, 2018 for Korea, and 2016 for Taiwan. The 
preference margin is calculated using the Tariff Analysis Online Facility provided by the 
WTO. The product p in the empirical analysis is defined at a tariff-line level in each country. 
The data on GDP and GDP per capita are obtained from the World Development Indicator 
maintained by the World Bank. The data on geographical distance is drawn from the CEPII 
website. The data on scores on trading across borders are obtained from the Doing Business 
database by the World Bank. 7  The basic statistics and correlation matrix among the 
variables in this study are provided in the Appendix. 
Last, noteworthy is that the analysis in this study is a cross-sectional one. The data, 
which are not panel data, include the only single year for each country. Although the data 
exist for a few years for specific countries, those data do not represent long enough periods 
to investigate the role of country characteristics after controlling for country fixed effects. 
Therefore, the correlation of RTA utilization rates is examined with several factors rather 
                                                   
7 According to the metadata of this database, the score for trading across borders is a simple average of 
the cost to export and import, time to export and import, and the number documents to export and import. 
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than the causal impact of such factors on RTA utilization rates. Nevertheless, the analyses 
in this study are still invaluable because few studies exist on RTA utilization rates that use 
the data with multiple importing countries. Indeed, although recent studies on gravity 
estimation tend to examine the causal effects, prior studies conducted cross-sectional 
analyses. Thus, causal analyses are left for the future when researchers can gain access to 
RTA utilization data in a more significant number of countries. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
This section reports the estimation results. Because the data on RTA utilization are 
obtained from the importer side, standard errors are clustered by importing countries in all 
estimations. In the subsequent discussion, various models with various levels of fixed effects 
are estimated. The number of observations for estimation differs by specifications because 
singleton observations are dropped. 
The estimation results of the ordinary least square (OLS) are indicated in column (I) 
in Table 3. In this estimation, fixed effects are controlled at an HS six-digit level. The result 
in the preference margin is the opposite of the expectation. Its coefficient is estimated to be 
significantly negative. An importer’s GDP has an insignificant coefficient, whereas the 
coefficient for an exporter’s GDP per capita is significantly negative. The efficiency scores 
within borders have a significantly positive coefficient for importers but not for exporters. 
The coefficient for geographical distance turns out to be insignificant. This model is also 
estimated by using the fractional logit method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), 
since the dependent variable in this study lies in the unit interval, that is, [0, 1]. To prevent 
an incidental parameter problem, the fixed effects defined in the section on HS classification 
rather than an HS six-digit are controlled for. The results are presented in column (II). 
Although the magnitude of the coefficients is different, the statistical significance does not 
change compared with the case of the OLS results, except that the coefficient for the 
preference margin becomes insignificant. 
 
Table 3 
 
Worth discussing are these results. Although the literature has shown that the 
preference margin plays a key role in RTA utilization, the robust results that would indicate 
such a role are not necessarily found. The insignificant result in the importer’s GDP is 
somewhat surprising because it seemed to be one of the critical elements in Table 2.8 In 
contrast, the coefficient for an exporter’s GDP per capita is significantly negative, which is 
                                                   
8 These insignificant results do not change even if the log of an importer’s border score is excluded, which 
has a relatively high correlation with the importer’s GDP, as found in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Furthermore, when the importer’s GDP per capita was introduced instead of the importer’s GDP, the 
coefficient for the importer’s GDP per capita is again estimated to be insignificant.  
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consistent with the trend found in Table 2. The negative sign is also compatible with the 
theoretical prediction when GDP per capita is used as a proxy for wages. Another 
interpretation is that, in low-income countries, goods are exported by a small number of 
large firms. If such firms use RTA regimes, the RTA utilization rates evaluated at a value-
basis may be higher. The significant importance of efficient borders only on the importer 
side may indicate that the border clearance in import customs plays a more critical role in 
RTA utilization than the process of issuing CoOs in an exporting country (if the latter is 
correlated with border efficiency). 
As implied in Table 2, the availability of other preference regimes (e.g., GSP for LDC) 
seems to play a vital role in the magnitude of the RTA utilization rate. Therefore, some 
elements related to other preference regimes are examined. In addition to the GSP, various 
other preference regimes exist. For example, the import duty for some goods (e.g., capital 
goods) might be exempted by the investment promotion regime against foreign companies. 
Additionally, the duty-drawback regime exempts or reduces the duty for raw materials 
imported for the production of export products.9 The benefits similar to those offered by 
these duty-drawback regimes may be provided to firms in designated special/free economic 
zones. If these preference regimes are available, firms may not need to utilize RTA regimes. 
Three variables are introduced into the model to examine the role of these other 
preference regimes. The first one is a log of inward FDI (in terms of stock) in the importing 
country (Importer’s FDI stock). Foreign companies tend to locate in special/free economic 
zones or enjoy investment promotion regimes. Thus, the high utilization of such other 
regimes is expected in importing countries with large inward FDI.10 Second, a dummy 
variable equal to a value of one if a concerned product is categorized into finished products 
is introduced (Finished Dummy). Because finished products cannot be further processed, the 
duty-drawback regime is less utilized when importing finished products. Finished products 
are defined as items categorized into 112, 122, 41, 51, 52, 61, 62, or 63 in the Broad Economic 
Categories classification. Third, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if GSP for LDC 
is available is introduced (LDC Dummy). Specifically, it becomes the value of one when 
exporting from Cambodia, Laos, or Myanmar to Japan or Korea. 
The estimation results of the OLS and fractional logit methods are reported in columns 
(III) and (IV), respectively. Because the dummy variable on finished products is defined at 
an HS-six-digit level, section fixed effects are controlled for in the fractional logit model and 
                                                   
9 In several studies, the economic effects of duty drawback regimes were examined. The examples 
include Hamada (1974), Panagariya (1992), Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (2003), Ianchovichina (2004, 
2007), Mah (2007), and Brandt and Morrow (2017). 
10 The data are obtained from the UNCTAD Stat managed by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development. We do not use the inward FDI at a bilateral basis from the following two reasons. One 
is that due to our inclusion of developing countries, the reliable and comparable data on bilateral FDI are 
not available. The other is that Japanese firms have developed international production networks in Asia. 
They get engaged in back-and-forth trade among them across Asian countries. The FDI defined at a 
country pair-basis results in masking such trade. 
10 
 
the OLS estimation, that is, column (III). The previous variables, that is, those included in 
column (I), have similar results as before. One notable difference is that the coefficients for 
an importer’s GDP turn out to be significantly positive. The coefficients for the importer’s 
inward FDI are negatively significant, indicating that the utilization rate is lower when more 
foreign companies exist in the importing country. This result represents the first evidence 
in the literature on the role of FDI in RTA utilization rates. The dummy variable on GSP for 
LDC also has a negative coefficient but is insignificant in the OLS result, that is, column (III). 
The insignificant result in the OLS is partly explained by the high RTA utilization rate when 
exporting from Korea to Myanmar, as shown in Table 2. 
The dummy variable on finished products has a positive and significant coefficient, as 
is consistent with the previously described expectation. This result suggests that the RTA 
utilization rate is higher when importing finished products. Worth noting is that this result 
is the opposite of the result in Hakobyan (2015), who found that the utilization rate of the 
GSP regime in exporting to the United States is higher in primary products. Her 
interpretation of this result was that unprocessed products do not require various inputs 
and, thus, are easier to meet the RoOs than more processed manufacturing products. In 
contrast to her result, this study found a higher utilization in more processed products 
among Asian countries probably because other preference regimes (e.g., a duty-drawback 
regime) are preferred when importing less processed products in Asia. In Asia, where other 
preference regimes have been popular in international business 11 , the effect of other 
preference regimes on RTA utilization becomes stronger than that of RoOs. 
Next, three robustness checks are conducted. First, to check the robustness of the result 
in the dummy on finished products, it is again regressed on after controlling for more 
elements. Specifically, in Table 3, although only some observable elements and section fixed 
effects are introduced, country pair fixed effects in addition to section fixed effects are 
controlled for. In other words, all country-specific factors are entirely controlled by fixed 
effects. The result by the OLS method is provided in column (I) in Table 4 and again presents 
the significantly positive coefficient for this dummy variable. Such a result does not change 
even if the fractional logit model is estimated, as indicated in column (II). In this estimation, 
exporting country fixed effects and importing country fixed effects are introduced instead 
of country pair fixed effects. Also controlled for is the country pair-specific element 
geographical distance, although its coefficient is insignificantly estimated. 
 
Table 4 
 
Second, as a proxy variable for demand, importer imports from the world (Importer’s 
total imports) are used instead of the more aggregated measure of GDP. Because this variable 
has an importer-product dimension, country pair fixed effects and exporter-product fixed 
                                                   
11 As shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix, for example, other preference regimes account for 46% of all 
imports into Thailand from Japan during 2018. 
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effects can be controlled for. This specification allows us to investigate the role of demand 
with more controls. Furthermore, the inclusion of exporter-product fixed effects contributes 
to controlling for the distribution of firm productivity in each exporting country. The result 
is presented in column (III) in Table 4 and indicates the significantly positive coefficient for 
importer imports from the world, although the preference margin again has an insignificant 
coefficient. A larger demand (in terms of total imports) in the importing country is 
associated with the RTA utilization rate. 
Third, so far, significantly positive results in the preference margin have not been 
obtained. To check whether such results still exist even after controlling for as many other 
elements as possible, fixed effects with the full dimension, that is, country pair fixed effects, 
importer-product (tariff-line-level) fixed effects, and exporter-product (HS six-digit-level) 
fixed effects, are introduced. In other words, the role of preference margin is examined after 
controlling almost all of the remaining elements. The result from the OLS method is 
provided in column (IV) and indicates a significantly positive coefficient for the preference 
margin, which is consistent with the results of many existing studies. This result implies 
that controlling for other elements is essential when evaluating the effect of the preference 
margin. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, the determinants of RTA utilization were empirically examined using 
the RTA utilization data with rich country-variation in both importing and exporting 
countries. Specifically, trade data among 16 exporters and six importers in Asia were 
utilized. As a result, the RTA utilization rate was found to be higher when the preference 
margin is larger, the importer’s demand is larger, the exporter’s GDP per capita is lower, 
and the importer’s border handling efficiency score is higher. Furthermore, lower RTA 
utilization rates were also found when the GSP for LDC is available, when exporting 
finished products, and when the inward FDI is larger in the importing country. These results, 
some of which are new to the body of literature, have stronger external validity than existing 
studies using single country data.  
Exporting countries examined in this study are negotiating the RCEP. The RCEP 
increases trade, especially between countries that remain not covered by any RTAs because 
the preference margin becomes positive. Another key feature of the RCEP is to include the 
16 countries in one RTA. If firms enjoy a cumulation rule in the RoOs, they could more easily 
comply with RoOs than before. The use of the cumulation rule induces firms to switch from 
using other preference regimes (e.g., a duty-drawback regime) to that of an RTA regime (i.e., 
RCEP) because the former regime cannot be used in the final stage of supply chains, that is, 
finished products. Improving the procedure of CoOs, that is, reducing RTA utilization costs 
is essential to encourage firms to use the cumulation rule. 
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Table 1. Simple Average of MFN Tariff Rates (%) 
IDN JPN KOR PHL THA TWN
2016 2018 2018 2018 2018 2016
Live animals 5 8 20 10 11 19
Vegetable products 5 6 107 10 22 20
Animal/vegetable fats and oils 4 4 14 9 22 13
Food products 22 14 29 11 28 19
Mineral products 3 1 4 2 2 1
Chemical products 5 2 8 3 3 3
Plastics and rubber 9 2 7 8 6 5
Leather products 9 11 8 7 10 3
Wood products 5 3 6 7 6 2
Paper products 4 0 0 6 3 0
Textiles 14 7 10 11 15 9
Footwear 16 15 10 10 20 6
Plastic or glass products 8 1 8 7 11 7
Precious metals 7 1 5 5 3 0
Base Metal 9 1 4 5 6 2
Machinery 5 0.0 6 3 4 3
Transport equipment 20 0.1 6 20 49 9
Precision machinery 5 0.2 7 2 3 2
Miscellaneous 10 2 5 8 14 3  
Source: Calculated by the authors using the Tariff Analysis Online Facility provided by the WTO 
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Table 2. RTA Utilization Rates (%) 
IDN JPN KOR PHL THA TWN
Exporter 2016 2018 2018 2018 2018 2016
Australia 36 96 79 54 64
China 38 50 63 48 41
India 31 82 75 35 53
Japan 29 18 38
Korea 28 31 50
New Zealand 65 16 89 81 82 98
Brunei Darussalam 38 70 67 92 15
Indonesia 87 84 79 76
Cambodia 28 10 56 59 70
Laos 70 19 39 75 65
Myanmar 36 7 91 67 43
Malaysia 45 79 47 55 37
Philippines 44 95 46 51
Singapore 24 52 19 26 32 36
Thailand 49 93 69 73
Vietnam 39 82 64 60 71
Importer
 
Note: This table reports the share of RTA imports out of total imports in RTA-eligible products. 
Source: Calculated by the authors using data from Indonesian Customs, the Philippine Statistics Authority, 
Thai Customs, Japanese Customs, Korean Customs, and Taiwanese Customs. 
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Table 3. Baseline Results 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Margin -0.140* -0.32 -0.004 -0.041
[0.062] [0.547] [0.137] [0.584]
ln Importer's GDP 0.027 0.108 0.073** 0.307**
[0.021] [0.137] [0.023] [0.132]
ln Exporter's GDP per capita -0.046* -0.293* -0.049* -0.291*
[0.022] [0.160] [0.021] [0.151]
ln Importer's border score 0.410*** 2.270*** 0.379*** 2.283***
[0.078] [0.613] [0.076] [0.441]
ln Exporter's border score -0.079 -0.214 -0.105 -0.487
[0.194] [1.157] [0.205] [1.175]
ln Distance -0.012 -0.021 -0.013 -0.051
[0.058] [0.353] [0.058] [0.355]
ln Importer's FDI stock -0.087** -0.463***
[0.024] [0.138]
Finished Dummy 0.023* 0.141**
[0.010] [0.066]
LDC Dummy -0.275 -1.377*
[0.144] [0.715]
HS 6-digit FE X
Section FE X X X
Method OLS Fraction OLS Fraction
Number of obs 149,939 150,082 150,082 150,082
Adj R-squared 0.2049 0.1453
Log pseudolikelihood -72371 -71744  
Source: Authors’ estimation 
Notes: The model is estimated using the OLS method (OLS) or the fractional logit method (Fraction). The 
dependent variable is the RTA utilization rate. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. The square brackets denote standard errors clustered by importers.  
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Table 4. Robustness Checks 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Margin 0.043 0.242 0.029 0.557**
[0.122] [0.619] [0.035] [0.159]
ln Importer's total imports 0.023***
[0.004]
ln Distance 0.031
[0.086]
Finished Dummy 0.026** 0.165**
[0.009] [0.065]
Section FE X X
Country pair FE X X X
Importer FE X
Exporter FE X
Importer-product FE X
Exporter-product FE X X
Method OLS Fraction OLS OLS
Number of obs 150,082 150,082 137,607 129,362
Adj R-squared 0.2264 0.4126 0.447
Log pseudolikelihood -67560  
Source: Authors’ estimation 
Notes: The model is estimated using the OLS method (OLS) or the fractional logit method (Fraction). The 
dependent variable is the RTA utilization rate. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. The square brackets denote standard errors clustered by importers.  
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Appendix. Other Tables 
 
 
Table A1. Basic Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Utilization 150,082 0.266 0.387 0 1
Margin 150,082 0.089 0.092 0.000 7.953
ln Importer's GDP 150,082 13.562 0.723 12.710 15.419
ln Exporter's GDP per capita 150,082 2.460 1.225 0.176 4.168
ln Importer's border score 150,082 4.340 0.149 4.140 4.527
ln Exporter's border score 150,082 4.333 0.147 3.865 4.527
ln Distance 150,082 8.006 0.643 6.264 9.239
ln Importer's FDI stock 150,082 16.704 0.450 15.932 17.034
Finished Dummy 150,082 0.436 0.496 0 1
LDC Dummy 150,082 0.013 0.112 0 1
ln Importer's total imports 150,082 15.150 2.414 0 23.954  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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Table A2. Correlation Matrix 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Utilization [1] 1
Margin [2] 0.039 1
ln Importer's GDP [3] 0.166 -0.045 1
ln Exporter's GDP per capita [4] -0.220 -0.029 -0.214 1
ln Importer's border score [5] 0.226 0.102 0.379 -0.170 1
ln Exporter's border score [6] -0.189 -0.022 -0.188 0.726 -0.209 1
ln Distance [7] -0.022 -0.040 0.188 0.193 0.008 -0.055 1
ln Importer's FDI stock [8] 0.050 0.162 0.652 -0.145 0.212 -0.148 0.034 1
Finished Dummy [9] 0.024 0.252 0.036 -0.023 0.071 -0.036 0.017 0.021 1
LDC Dummy [10] 0.000 0.017 0.185 -0.188 0.123 -0.196 0.050 0.056 0.086 1
ln Importer's total imports [11] 0.116 -0.076 0.219 -0.088 0.147 -0.060 0.074 0.119 -0.025 0.088  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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Figure A1. Imports of Thailand from Japan in 2018 by Tariff Regimes (Regime, Billion Thai 
Baht, %) 
 
Source: Thai Customs. 
Note: JTEPA, FZ, EPZ, and AJCEP refer to Japan-Thailand economic partnership agreement, free zone, 
economic processing zone, and ASEAN-Japan comprehensive economic partnership, respectively. 
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